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A method for developing the require-
ments for in-space assembly, servic-
ing, and checkout of proposed Mars
space transfer vehicles is dis-
cussed. Required in-space opera-
tions and functions are identified
in relation to various Earth to Or-
bit (ETO) vehicles by looking at
the manifesting options of baseline
Mars Space Transfer Vehicles (STV).
Each operation is then reduced to a
minimum complexity state resulting
in a set of operational primitive
functions. These primitive func-
tions are used to assess the trade-
offs between robotic, telerobotic,
and EVA operations. The study dem-
onstrates that the complexity of
the in-space operations remains sta-
ble with ETO vehlcle size, and
therefore the functions, and ulti-
mately the infrastructure required
to support proposed missions, are
relatively unaffected by varying
the ETO vehicle size within the
range considered for this study.
In undertaking a study of this or
any other issue the first question
which needs to be asked is, why do
the study at all? In the area of
in-space assembly/servicing require-
ments, several compelling reasons
exist. The first is that the abil-
ity to llve and work in space is es-
sential to the future of NASA. In-
space operations are an inherent
part of all spacecraft mission sce-
narios. In generic form In-space
operations consists of all activity
that takes place between launch
from the earth and landing back on
earth or on another planet. Assem-
bling and servicing operations are
only subcategorles of the overall
In-space operations picture. The
ability to assemble proposed apace-
craft, and provide essential servic-
ing during a mission is a critical
aspect of mission success. The cur-
rent baseline Mars STV is a case in
point. Current estimates indicate
that seven launches will be r_-
qulred to place all of the propel-
lent and hardware in orbit, with
over of fifteen months elapsing be-
tween the first and last launch.
During this period of time the hard-
ware components must be assembled,
stored, maintained, and inspected.
Systems must be available to pro-
vide power, communicate status, pro-
vide thermal control, inspect, as-
semble, manipulate, maneuver, and
calibrate the vehicle. Failure to
understand the technologies and the
systems required to carryout these
operations will have a direct im-
pact on the safety of the crew,
their ability to carry out a suc-
cessful mission, and the total life
cycle mission cost.
The second reason to undertake such
a study is the need to understand
operations early in the mission de-
sign process. In an era of tight
budgets, and high expectations from
the administration, the congress,
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and the public, NASA cannot afford
to wait until the later stages of
mission planning to consider the im-
pact of operations at the detail
level. A look at our current space
transportation system underscores
this point. The orbiter was de-
signed to achieve a given perform-
ance level, with support operations
being developed later in the pro-
gram to fit the vehicle design. As
a result of this approach extensive
rework, refurbishment, and/or re-
placement is required between each
launch. The development of a de-
tailed support operations scenario
as an integral part of the vehicle
design process would have identi-
fied some of the labor intensive
limitations imposed by the design,
and resulted in simpler, more effi-
cient methods for achieving the
original design intent which was as-
sured access to space. Some of the
current operations and servicing re-
quirements for mating the orbiter
to the external tank could not be
carried out in space with the pre-
sent design. However, the func-
tions which are carried out by
these operations must necessarily
be performed in space to mate vehi-
cle components to propellent tanks.
If we fail to consider the require-
ments that each necessary function
or operation places on the design
of the vehicle, we will quickly
drive total mission cost to unac-
ceptable levels, and Jeopardize
NASA's commitment to total quality
throughout mission life.
The third reason for considering op-
erations at this point is that we
in NASA, in the early days after
Apollo, made a promise to the pub-
lic Inreturn for their enthusiasm,
excitement and support. That prom-
ise was that we, as a nation, would
learn to live and work in space.
Based on current talk within the
agency in general, and within the
Space Exploration Initiative (SEI)
office in particular, doubts are
raised as to whether we still be-
lieve we can achieve the promise.
We owe the public a clear answer,
not only to decide for ourselves if
we can still keep the promise, but
to also inform the public of the
level of activity which will be nec-
essary to achieve the promise if we
believe we can do so.
Introduction
The primary objective of the study
was to approach the issue of re-
qulrements from a systematic view-
point. We did not start with a
list of what we thought might be
nice, nor did we start from a plat-
form or waystation concept and work
backwards to decide what we could
do with the systems that were avail-
able. We started by determining
what needed to be accomplished. The
expected output was a llst of top
level requirements generated from
the operatlone which were dictated
by vehicle design, ETO llmltatlons,
and ground based integration capa-
bility. In addition we attempted
to determine the minimum manpower
which would be required to carry
out the operations using robotics,
telerobotlcs, or EVA. We attempted
to hold to the legacy expressed in
the Synthesis Report- of "ensuring
optimum use of man-ln-the-loop".
As the report stated "Don't burden
man if a machine can do it as well
or better, and vice versa". Going
into the study we neither required
or eliminated any method of carry-
ing out the operations.
The approach taken for the study
was to first understand current
thinking on the Space Exploration
Initiative (SEI) strategy and op-
tions. We then selected a baseline
Mars STV and launch vehicle. Be-
cause of the options which were be-
ing developed with respect to Heavy
Lift Launch Vehicles (HLLV) we de-
cided to carry both a 150 metric
tonne and a 250 metric tonne vehi-
cle through the study. There was a
clear understanding that both the
ETO vehicle and the Mars STV would
change as the program evolves. How-
ever, sufficient thought had been
given to current concepts that all
of the necessary ingredients are in-
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cluded, and any changes would have
little impact on the top level op-
eratlons which would be required.
Use was then made of information de-
velo_d under an Infrastructure
Study led by the Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC}, with partici-
pation by the Langley Research Cen-
ter (LaRC), the Stennls Space Cen-
ter (SSC), the Kennedy Space Center
(KSC), and the Lewis Research Cen-
ter (LeRC). Thl8 study manifested
the baseline Mars STV on both 150
tonne and 250 tonne vehicles. In
addition, the study looked at the
trade-offs which would be required,
because of the manifest, on both
ground based and In-space opera-
tions. By making use of these
trade-ells we were able to develop
a top level operational scenario de-
tailing the steps which must take
place in space. Basic functions,
and ultimately functional primi-
tives, were generated from thls op-
erational scenario for In-space as-
sembly of the Mars STV. These
basic functions allowed generation
of hardware systems and subsystems
necessary to perform the functions.
We then looked at both the func-
tional primitives and the hardware
systems and subsystems to make a de-
termination of whether EVA or ro-
botic techniques were best suited
to the activity. These systems and
subsystems became the requirements
for any In-space infrastructure
which will be used to carry out the
goal of learning to live and work
in space.
on the design of the STV, and the
mission duration, due to the volume
constraints of the ETO launch vehi-
cle shroud, and the Inltlal mass in
low earth orbit (IMLEO) capability.
For purposed of this study we have
defined rendezvous and docking as
involving no more than two launches
to low earth orbit with most hard-
ware integration being performed on
the ground. Two major components
would be placed in LEO by separate
launches and would be Joined in or-
bit by automated latching tech-
niques.
In-space assembly has been defined
as involving multiple launches.
Prelntegration of large complex com-
ponents would still be accomplished
on the ground. However, major sys-
tem and subsystem integration would
be performed An space.
Current SEI mission strategy calls
for both piloted and cargo lunar
missions to be completed using the
direct launch of fully integrated
vehicles if possible. Rendezvous
and docking would be used if suffl-
cientLHLLV capability has not been
developed by the mission need date.
Mars STV'8 present a different prob-
lem. Although the cargo vehicle
could be broken into two major com-
ponents which allows utilization of
SEI Mission Options
Three potential mission options
have been suggested for vehicle in-
tegration for the SEI program as
follows:
o Direct launch of fully integrated
vehicles
• Rendezvous and docking in LEO
with preintegrated components
e Assemble in space
Direct launch of fully integrated
vehicles imposes severe limitations
Figure 1: Ero Vehide Classes
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rendezvous and docking techniques,
the mass and volume requirements of
the piloted vehlcle dictates that
in-space assembly be performed.
Figure 1 shows both the IS0 tonne
and 250 tonne classes of ETO vehi-
cles which were considered in the
reference 2 Infrastructure Study.
Asstmmpfions
The following assumptions were made
prior to the start of the study:
• The components that were deter-
mined to be required for an in-
space infrastructure would be
available as required.
o Enabling technologies would be de-
veloped to a sufficient level and
in sufficient time to be incorpo-
rated into required systems as
needed.
o Current technology and the ad-
vances which we expect to achieve
over the next decade make telero-
botic operation more practical
than autonomous operation. There-
fore, telerobotics would be con-
sidered as the first alternative
to EVA operations.
o All hardware components would be
inspected upon arrival on orbit.
o All components would be secured
to the launch structure with re-
motely activated latches.
o The launch vehicle/structure
would be capable of rendezvous
with the infrastructure.
o Space Station Freedom (SSF) would
be operational during the advance
development phase of any program
for infrastructure development.
o Launch centers would be deter-
mined by KSC based on ground proc-
essing requirements, and resource
availability.
o The baseline Mars STV would be
the 2016 reference NERVA deriva-
tive Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR)
propulslon concept, defined by
Boeing Defense and Space Group in
their Phase I Spac_ Transfer Con-
cepts final report- to MSFC in
March 1991.
160 _ne ETO Bomd_e
Figure2: Mars STV Baseline Concepts
D_cussion
During the reference 2 Infrastruc-
ture Study the baseline Mars STV
was modified with different 81ze
propellent tanks for a 250 tonne
ETO vehicle so that it would more
effectively utilize the volume and
IMLEO capability of the larger
launch vehicle. Figure 2 shows the
Mars STV concepts for each class of
ETO vehicle considered.
The baseline Mars STV has a mass of
735,190 Kg which includes 525
tonnes of propellant and 92 tonnes
of inert mass for the propulsion
system. Figure 3 shows the base-
line vehicle manifesting on a 150
tonne ETO vehicle as developed in
the reference 2 infrastructure
study. Figure 4 provides the same
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information for the Mars STV as it
was modified for a 250 tonne ETO ve
hlcle.
Impact of Ground Based Operations
Recent In-house studies performed
at KSC 4 reviewed the launch facili-
ties and ground based operational
requirements which would be imposed
by a National Launch System (NLS).
These studies identified a 150
tonne HLLV which could be used to
launch the Mars STV. The HLLV
ground processing time was deter-
mined to be 79 days between
launches. Because of the con-
stralnts of other operations at KSC
it was assumed that serial process-
ing of the Mars STV launch vehicles
would be required. This serial
processing, along with the 79 day
ground processing time, results in
a total of 474 days between the
time that the components included
in the first launch arrive on or-
bit, and the time that the compo-
nents from the seventh launch are
available for assembly. Since MOC
tank #3 is manifested on the first
launch, cryogenic hydrogen boil-off
must be considered as a part of the
fuel management functions which are
identified in the study.
R_
Once the manifesting of the base-
line Mars STV's had been completed,
a top level operational scenario
was developed. This scenario
looked at the major operations
which would be necessary to accept,
on orbit, the components from each
launch and then assemble, mate,
store, and maintain these compo-
nents until the vehicle integration
was completed. The completed state
was defined to be, when all of the
components, propellent, and expend-
able had been assembled and/or
loaded on board the Mars STV, and
the vehicle had been fully checked
out and prepared for engine firing
for trans Mars injection (TMI).
This included transfer of the crew
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for final checkout and verification
functions.
The operational scenarios for the
first two launches, for both a 150
tonne ETO vehicle and a 250 tonne
ETO vehicle are as follows:
Operational Scenario for 150 tonne ETO Vehicle:
Launch # I
o Activate Communications / Power
Systems
o Checkout / Calibrate On-Board In-
spection Systems
o Inspect Components / Verify
Health after Launch
o Demate MOC tank #3 from Launch
Structure
" Maneuver MOC tank #3 to Storage /
Berth Location
" Demate Remaining Components from
Launch Structure
o Deploy Truss Structure
o Verify Truss Is Locked in De-
ployed Configuration
o Activate Monitoring System
" Manage STV Attitude for Thermal
Control
o Provide Debris Protection
Launch # 2
o Receive, Rendezvous, Dock Compo-
nents from Second Launch
o Checkout On-Board Health Monitor-
ing Systems
o Inspect Components / Verify Health
o Demate MEV from Launch Structure
o Maneuver and Attach MEV to Truss
Structure
o Demate Aeroshell from Launch
Structure
o Deploy Aeroshell
o Inspect Aeroshell Joints and Seals
o Repair, Reseal TPS Joints as Re-
quired
o Provide Inspection / Verification
Data to Mission Control
o Demate MOC tank #2 from Launch
Structure
o Manipulate MOC tank #2 into Posi-
tion
o Attach MOC tank #2 to Truss Struc-
ture
o Unberth and Manipulate MOC tank
#3 into Position
o Attach MOC tank #3 to STY Truss
Structure
o Verify All Joint Connections
• Make All Utility (Communlca-
tlon/Power/Heaith) Connections
o Make Fuel Connections between MOC
tank #2 & Manifold
o Perform Fuel Connection Leak Check
Operational Scenario for 250 tonne ETO Vehide:
hunch # I
o Activate Communication / Power
Systems
o Checkout / Calibrate On-Board In-
spection Systems
o Inspect Components / Verify
Health After Launch
o Demate Components from Launch
Structure
o Maneuver and Berth Aeroshell /
Launch Structure
o Deploy Truss Structure
o Verify Truss is Locked in De-
ployed Configuration
o Demate Aeroshell from Berth /
Launch Structure
o Deploy Aeroshell
o Attach Aeroshell to Truss and In-
spect Joints / Seals
o Repair/Reseal Joints as Required
o Provide Lighting for Remote In-
spection
o Provide Inspection / Verification
Data to Mission Control
o Activate Large Space Structure
Control System
o Manage STV Attitude for Thermal
Control
o Provide Debris Protection
Laugh #2
o Receive, Rendezvous, Dock Compo-
nents from Second Launch
o Checkout On-Board Health Monitor-
Ing Systems
o Demate Components from Launch
Structure
o Inspect Components / Verify Health
o Maneuver and Berth TMI tank #3
o Demate Aft Components from Launch
Structure
o Maneuver Aft Components into Posi-
tion
o Attach Aft Components to Truss
Structure
681
o Verify Joint Connections
o Make Utility (Communication,
Power, Health) Connections
o Unberth and Manipulate TMI tank
#3 into Position
" Attach TMI tank #3 to STV Assembly
o Make Fuel Connections between TMI
tank #3 and Manifold
o Perform Fuel Connection Leak Check
During the study it was determined
that all of the operations which
are necessary to bring the Mars STV
to a fully integrated condition oc-
curred during the first two ETO
launches. After the operations
listed for the second launch have
taken place for both ETO vehicle op-
tions, we began to repeat the opera-
tions of maneuvering, attaching, re-
ceiving, manipulating, testing,
etc.. For the remaining launches
no new operations were identified.
This led to the development of a
list of basic operational functions
which are repeated during the assem-
bly and servicing phase of Mars STV
deployment. These basic functions
are as follows.
Basic Ope_fional l_._iom
e Deploy & Erect Structure
• Attach & (dis) Assemble Components
e Inspect Structure & Components
" (re) Calibrate Systems & Compo-
nents
e Receive, Rendezvous & Dock Compo-
nents
e Checkout Systems & Subsystems
e Berth & Store Components
o Maneuver Components into Position
e Manipulate Structures & Components
e Test & Verify Assemblies & Compo-
nents
e Make Utility Connections
e Provide Effective Lighting
e Communicate
e Generate & Store Power
o Control Large Space Structures
o Provide Thermal & Radiation Pro-
tection
e Provide Debris Protection
e Manage Cryo Fuel Transfer & Stor-
age
e Manage Mission Data
e Provide Support for Contingency IOperations
During the study it also became
clear that we could address the op-
erational functions An two differ-
ent ways. First, we could break
the operational functions into sev-
eral categories such as contingency
support operations, operational sup-
port, and mission functional primi-
tives. Second, we could use the op-
eratlonal functions to define the
systems which make up the top level
requirements for an In-space infra-
structure which would be required
for on-orbit integration of the
Mars STV's.
Operafiomd Cat_o_m
Thl8 first method of addressing the
functions demonstrates the interde-
pendencles and interrelationships
of the various operational func-
tions in each of the categories,
with the primitives being used to
determine the optimum method of car-
rying out each of the functions.
The contingency support operations
make use of most of the infrastruc-
ture systems, but come into play
only when normal operational func-
tions are out of tolerance, or when
the crew is arriving. As an exam-
ple component change out would oc-
cur only when an individual system
failed to function during in-space
verification, or if a system had
been damaged during operation. The
self correcting capability would be
utilized if a component did not fit
as planned, or if alignment prob-
lems were encountered because of
tolerance buildup or thermal
changes to the structure. These ex-
amples also point out the need for
early consideration of the In-space
operations. Any problem which
might call on the contingency sup-
port functions needs to be consid-
ered during the design process.
The operational support functions
are those which primarily involve
control of the infrastructure and
its activities, or provide support
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to the functlonal primitives in car-
rying out the primary mission of
the infrastructure.
The third category includes those
functions which are necessary to
complete the primary mission of an
infrastructure, which is to assem-
ble and service a Mars STV. These
are the activities which require di-
rect intervention by EVA, robotic,
or telerobotic techniques. Func-
tions in this category have been re-
duced to a set of functional primi-
tives. The reduction in this
manner is not intended to indicate
ease of carrying out the function.
In fact, Just the opposite can be
true. Some of the assembly and
servicing activities can involve
many of the functional primitives
which, when combined, can become
very difficult operations. The
primitive functions can themselves
be further reduced to a set of very
difficult operations on a detail
level. Also some of the operations
which require reasonable simple ap-
pllcatlon of the primitive func-
tions can become very difficult due
to the nature of the component be-
ing acted on. For example the act
of moving the TMI tanks into posi-
tion for attachment to the truss
structure involves simple actions.
However, when the tanks are nearly
full of hydrogen propellent, in a
zero gravity environment, any move-
ment of the tank can cause a shift-
ing of the hydrogen propellent set-
ting up a dynamic oscillatlon which
must be damped out. In this cage
an operation which involves simple
functions becomes very difficult to
carry out.
The basic operational functions in
each of the three categories are
listed below:
Contingency Suppo_ Operations:
Component Changeout
Tool Storage
Capture & Retrieval
Self Correcting Capability
Assist with Crew Transfer
Operafion_Suppo_:
Lighting
Communication
Power Generation
Power Storage
Facility Control & Monitoring
Data Management
Component Storage / Berthing
Mission Functional Primitives:
Acquire Rotate
Attach Transport
Maneuver Verify
Manipulate Withdraw
Berth Test
Inspect Operate
Install Insert
These mlssionfunctlonal primitives
are activities which are ideally
suited to advance telerobo_ic opera-
tion. Independent studies- have
looked at the tlmellnes which would
result from using EVA, IVA and tel-
erobotic operations. These studies
indicate that total elapsed process-
ing time would increase by 62% if
the operations were performed tel-
erobotlcally from the ground in-
stead of using EVA. However, the
operations can easily be performed
telerobotically from the ground
within the 79 day launch center for
the HLLV. Total llfe cycle cost
would decrease dramatically by us-
ing telerobotlc operations. The
only activity occurring on-board an
infrastructure between launches is
assembly and servicing functions,
or station keeping. There would be
no impact if assembly time were dou-
bled or tripled over what would be
required by EVA activity so long as
the activity could be carried out
prior to the next launch. The stud-
ies indicate that even with the In-
creased time for telerobotlc opera-
tlons the majority of the time
between launches would still be
spent in a station keeping mode.
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Functions_ta_nMatrix
The second method of addressing the
basic operational functions results
in an extensive matrix which re-
lates each of the functions to the
systems and subsystems which are
necessary to perform the functions.
This matrix is shown in tables la
through ld. Each of the systems or
subsystems listed directly serves
at least one of the functions, or
there i8 some connectivity between
the system/subsystem and the func-
tion. An iterative process was em-
ployed in developing the matrix.
First, the systems which were di-
rectly requlredle for performing a
function were listed. Each system
was then reevaluated against every
other function to determine if
there was any connectivity to the
other functions. In other words,
although a function did not require
a specific system to perform the ac-
tivity, could that activity be en-
hanced by using systems that are
necessary to carry out some other
function?
The resulting systems/subsystems be-
come the top level requirements for
an In-space infrastructure to sup-
port the assembly and servicing of
a Mars STY. The requirements are
independent of any current infra-
structure concept. They provide a
basis for evaluating concepts as to
their ability to carryout required
operations. These top level infra-
structure system requirements are
isted below:
Reqm_d S_tems
Structural for supporting the
other systems
, Robotic Manipulators for assembly
Computers & Software for Data Man-
agement
Power Generation & Storage
Communication Hardware & Software
Remote Health Monitoring Sensors
Visual Inspection Hardware & Soft-
ware
Cryogenic Fuel Control
* Docking, Berthing Mechanisms
* Lighting Units (Fixed & Moveable)
o Guidance, Navigation & Control
o Storage Mechanisms
o Shielding (Thermal, Debris, Radia-
tion)
Condusions
In-space assembly and servicing of
Mars Space Transfer Vehiclss will
be required.
The infrastructure required to
carry out the assembly and servic-
ing activity is determined by the
operational functions.
Within a given range of ETO vehicle
'sizes the infrastructure require-
ments are independent of the launch
vehicle sizes.
The systems and subsystems defined
by this study are the top level re-
qulrements for an infrastructure.
The complexity of the operations
which must take place in space for
assembly and servicing of the Mars
STV are independent of launch vehi-
cle size.
The frequency with which the assem-
bly and servicing operations must
be carried out is entirely depend-
ent on launch vehicle size.
The functional primitives which
have been defined in this study are
ideally suited for telerobotic op-
eration.
The 79 day launch centers required
for ground based processing of the
ETO vehicle 18 considerably longer
than the time required for telero-
botlc assembly of the STV compo-
nents.
R_ommendafions
There are four major recommenda-
tions resulting from this study.
The first recommendation should
carry the highest priority with the
other three carrying about the same
weight.
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I. We must include In-space opera-
tional analysis as an integral part
of current planning for all future
missions. If we fall to consider
detail In-space operational analy-
sis from the conceptual mission
stage forward we will quickly drive
mission costs to unacceptable lev-
els, and Jeopardize NASA'o commit-
ment to total 1lie cycle quality.
(NASS-37S88) for Marshall Space
Flight Center, General Dynamics
Space SystemsDivlsion, San Diego,
CA; December 3, 1991
3. Wookcock, G., et al.z Space
Transfer Concepts and Analysis for
Exploration Missions, Phase 1 Final
Report, Boeing Defense & Space
Group, Advance Civil Space Systems,
Huntsville, ALl March 1991
2. We must conduct a more detailed
analysis of the interdependencles
between in-space operations and
ground based processing.
3. We need to carry the operational
scenario's presented in this study
to a more detailed level, and de-
velop the operational tlmelines for
specific mission scenario's.
4. We should conduct system analy-
sis studies of each proposed Mars
STV assembly option (Free Flyer,
Saddle, Mini Depot, Platform} with
respect to the requirements devel-
oped under this study, so that we
can better understand their applica-
bility for future use.
In addition numerous lower level
recommendations could be generated
with respect to developlng and re-
fining concepts for In-Space Assem-
bly and Servicing (ISAS) Facility
Infrastructures. These recommenda-
tions would cover the field from In-
depth system/subsystem analysis,
through facility concept develop-
ment, to performing detail life cy-
cle cost analysis of various op-
tions. Each of these are essential
to developing our ability to llve
and work in space, and for our Jour-
ney to other planets.
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